Government-Sponsored Systemic Character Assassination by Rothbart, Daniel
Journal of Applied Social Theory | Article 
____________________________________________________________ 
94 
Government-Sponsored Systemic Character 
Assassination 
Daniel Rothbart* 
George Mason University 
Vol 1, No 3 (2021), 94 - 111 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
The online version of this text can be found at socialtheoryapplied.com/journal/ 
 
Episodes of character association (CA) among political figures are ubiquitous in the 
current political landscape of the United States, where political campaigns routinely 
include ad hominem attacks of one’s opponent. Yet, another form of CA lies beneath 
the surface of political figures hurling insults at each other. CA is also situated within 
certain social-political systems that strategically deploy mechanisms to dominate a 
targeted population group by casting them as inherently inferior to society’s so-called 
pure members. The primary objective of this article is to characterize systemic 
character assassination [SCA] within the United States as an insidious form of 
disciplinary control. After identifying certain features of governmental domination 
over segments of society (section 1), the author introduces the notion of SCA (section 
2). A case study is provided of the systemic denigration of migrants seeking asylum in 
the United States (section 3). This case is followed by an analysis of SCA in terms of 
the power dynamics between governmental authorities and the targeted population 
group (section 4).  All of which indicates a fundamental tension between the state’s 
legitimacy as rightful rulers and its illegitimacy from the perspective of those 
subjected to the insidious manipulations of SCA.  
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Character assassinations [CA] have become normalized in the political landscape of the 
United States. The instruments used for maligning political figures are quite varied. These 
include anonymous lies, misquoting, manipulation of photos, silencing, acts of 
vandalism, name-calling, labeling with demonizing images, and accusations of mental 
illness, sexual deviance and other moral infractions (Shiraev, 2014). In the 2016 
presidential campaigns of the United States, the presidential candidates routinely 
resorted to such accusations. Donald Trump considers Barack Obama a liar because of 
Obama’s denial of his Muslim identity and Hillary Clinton corrupt. Hillary Clinton 
responded to the allegation by saying Trump was mentally unfit for the office of the 
Presidency (Kelly, 2018). In a climate of acrimony among political factions, the accusation 
of a negative action is often converted to a negative character. 
One powerful technique for maligning the character of political figures centers on 
deployment of Nazi imagery. In recent years, Vladimir Putin, Barack Obama and Donald 
Trump have been compared to Hitler and their policies maligned as suitable for the 
government of Nazi Germany (Laruelle, 2020, p. 308). With such comparisons, the 
character assassins seek to affix an irremovable trait on a political figure, casting them as 
fundamentally irredeemable. The protagonists of such attacks position themselves as 
truth-seekers who can expose the lies of a political figure, as if to declare: “This is who 
they really are!” Such protagonists seem to follow the norm that political capital is gained 
from ad hominem attacks. Current political rhetoric seems to accuse a political figure of 
lying, cheating or stealing money. With such accusations, the targeted official is then cast 
as a liar, cheat or thief. 
These examples follow a pattern in which one or more attacker intentionally seeks 
to harm or diminish the character of other individuals or groups through an instrument 
of degradation. Clearly, the agent’s purposive action is critical to such cases of CA. These 
cases conform to a pattern of agent-instrument-object, where an agent performs an action 
through the use of an instrument that targets an object.   
Is intentionality necessary for all cases of CA? I believe not. For a certain category 
of CA, an agent’s malicious intent is not required. Nor is an attacking instrument, such as 
name-calling, necessary. There is a category of CA in the underbelly of social-political 
systems. Such systems center a structure that crystalizes certain population groups as 
inferiors. With such systems, their lowly placement in the social-political order defines 
their existence. They are essentialized as diminished beings in such an order. The 
marginalized group members should know their place, recognize the limits of their 
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rewards and security and act properly with high power group members. No explicit 
subject-instrument-object sequence is required for such a placement. 
The primary objective of this chapter is to develop the notion of governmental 
authorities’ systemic character assassination [SCA] of targeted population groups. I 
begin with an overview of the ever-prevent dangers of governmental over-reach (section 
1). I then introduce the notion of SCA (section 2), followed by a case study regarding the 
systemic degradation of migrants by governmental authorities of the United States 
(section 3). I then recast the notion of SCA in terms of the dynamics of power between 
governmental authorities and a targeted population group (section 4). My concluding 
remarks center on a critical paradox of governmental power generally, revealing a 
perennial tension between its authority over political subjects and the ability of such 
subjects to rebel, resistance and react negatively. 
Government Sponsored Character Assassinations 
Of course, governmental authorities can abuse their power in many ways. One sort of 
abuse consists of the excessive use of physical force against its political subjects. Rather 
than the superficial features of governmental power, such excessive use of force is central 
to the sovereign state. The ever-present threat of state-sponsored violence underlies every 
governmental program. Such a threat is critical to the state’s right to rule over its subjects. 
Max Weber recognized such a threat. He writes: “We have to say that a state is a human 
community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force 
within a given territory. The state is considered the sole source of the ‘right’ to use 
violence” (Weber, 1946, p. 78). Michel Foucault finds in governmental power the constant 
threat of a different violence: state agencies’ mastery over mind and body. Hospitals, 
schools, and public health agencies deploy technologies that can manipulate each 
recipient of their services. All represent the non-elected forms of state power over its 
subjects.1 With such controls, the patient, student, client, or prisoner are objectified as the 
subjects of the techno-science of administration. Pierre Bourdieu warned against the 
symbolic violence of classification systems that prefigure state domination. In certain 
cases, such systems are manufactured to contort the thoughts of political subjects 
 
1 Foucault defines governmentality as an “ensemble force by the institutions, procedures, analyzes 
and reflection, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex 
form of power” regarding the management of the masses (1991, p. 102). 
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regarding their sense of identity and relations with others.2 He focused on the taken-for-
granted notions that contort the bonds and breaks between political subjects to define 
who and what ‘we’ are and are not as a nationality. 
The instruments of state-sponsored symbolic violence can be particularly 
pernicious. In recent decades, such violence has led to the slaughter of large segments of 
a nation’s population. Consider, for example, the Rwandan genocide of 1994, the Serbian 
attacks on Bosniaks in the 1990s, and the genocidal violence perpetrated in Darfur by the 
central government of Sudan. In these three cases, state propagandists dehumanized the 
targeted population with accusations of their irredeemable impurity. This means their 
taints cannot be removed by donning new clothing, amassing more wealth, or acquiring 
enhanced professional skills. This symbolic violence of manufactured degradation of a 
population group is designed to position them as fundamentally inferior. The 
complexities of population groups are thus reduced to crystalized polarities of purity and 
danger. As the impurities of society are cast as existential threats, the moral imperative 
for ‘good violence’ follows in lock-step. Anyone who loves their country, their neighbors 
and their children must presumably join the fight for survival. The narrative sequence of 
such propaganda tends to conform to the following pattern: 
▪ They have threatened us. 
▪ They will always threaten us. 
▪ They are bad. 
▪ We are potential victims. 
▪ We are normal, pure or virtuous. 
As “they’ are depicted as vicious, wicked, evil, or subhuman, “we” are good, brave, valiant, 
righteous and just.  
 Such narratives are intensified with emotionally riveting images. In addition to 
such narratives of enemy brutality, many propagandists for war traffic in images of the 
enemy as dirty, decayed or diseased (Alexander, et al., 2005). Such images became 
interlinked with the fear of the enemy’s pollution of the ‘good people’ at home. The fear 
that comes with heart-pondering images of enemy devastation of innocents is not only an 
individual emotion. Such fear is shared as part of the collective consciousness among all 
 
2 According to Bourdieu et al., “Through the framing it imposes upon practices, the state establishes 
and inculcates common forms and categories of perception and appreciation, social frameworks of 
perceptions, of understanding or of memory, in short state forms of classification” (1994, p. 13). 
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those who perceive themselves as potential targets. In the prelude to episodes of genocidal 
violence, protagonists often rely on the insect imagery. For example, the Hutu extremists 
advanced a propaganda campaign that cast the Tutsis as snakes and roaches. The 
proclamation of “kill or be killed” typically followed such vile projections. 
These state-sponsored propaganda campaigns draw upon instruments of 
stigmatization. Based on findings by social psychologists, stigmatization consists of three 
elements (Goffman, 1963). First, an individual [or group] exhibits certain features, or is 
accused falsely of exhibiting certain features that are unusual or distinctive—features that 
are cast as negative traits. Second, such features are presumably affixed to their essential 
nature as if a fundamental taint on their character. They are forever marked as lesser 
beings, as if living with a taint on their soul. Corrective measures cannot remove the taint 
of impurity. Third, in stigmatizing others, the accusers tacitly cast themselves and/or 
their affiliated social-political group as innocents. This practice of collective degradation 
gives the accusers a feeling of self-purification. For those who experience suffering, 
scapegoating practices can provide psychological comfort and relieve them of culpability.  
Such accusers can relish in their supremacy over the impurities of society.  
Character Assassination as Collective Erasure 
Of course, not all cases of state-sponsored stigmatization center on such explicit and vile 
degradation. Some governments stigmatize a segment of the population through subtle 
means. 
Collective erasure consists of a manufactured distortion of the social-political 
order in ways that diminish or remove a population group from the nation’s 
consciousness. In extreme cases, the targeted population group becomes symbolically 
invisible in the social-political order. Explicit erasure occurs in states that define the 
nation through a religious category. For example, the Basic Law of Saudi Arabia, Article 
1, states, “The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic state with Islam as its 
religion; Allah’s Book and the Sunnah of His Prophet, Allah’s prayers and peace be upon 
him, are its constitution.” By defining the nation in religious terms, Saudi Arabia is 
implicitly subordinating members of other faiths, which serves as the legalized basis of 
discriminatory practices. In like measure, Israel’s eleven Basic Laws—like a constitutional 
law—define the state as, “the state of the Jewish people.” This implies a sub-citizen status 
for non-Jews. 
Collective erasure can also be implied in a constitutional principle without being 
explicit. The preamble to the United States Constitution defines “a more perfect Union” 
Journal of Applied Social Theory, Vol. 1, 2021 
99 
with equal justice for all, but excludes voting rights for servants, women, and men without 
property. Other examples of tacit erasure are more easily hidden from the public. 
Consider cases where an indigenous group’s history is expunged from school textbooks 
or where accounts of their slaughter at the hands of the nation’s military leaders is ignored 
through public monuments glorifying these leaders. Other cases of erasure involve the 
technicalities of governmental administration, as in the failure to recognize the existence 
of an indigenous group.3 
These examples of explicit and tacit erasure show that certain sorts of CA are 
located in social or political systems. Collective erasure represents a kind of system that 
CA of certain population groups defines. Systemic character assassination [SCA] is 
defined through mechanisms that foster a diminished positioning of a population group 
in the nation’s collective understanding of the social-political order. Within SCA, such a 
group is assigned, artificially, a lower rank; they are cast as society’s inferiors. Such 
diminished positioning represents a critical element of the society’s structure, which 
implies a rank ordering of superior and inferior population groups. SCA constitutes a 
form of structural violence, in which the social-political systems of society are defined 
through mechanisms of inequality that makes the low power group vulnerable to abuse 
and suffering (Galtung, 1969). Structural violence causes destruction of the basic 
conditions of living such as extreme poverty, chronic hunger, unhealthy living conditions, 
or the denial of basic education.4 The mechanisms of SCA are typically depersonalized. 
Neither an agent with malice nor an instrument of direct vitriolic attack is required. No 
act of lying, silencing, name-calling, demonization or accusation of criminality is 
necessary for SCA to be operative. To be sure, specific actions of CA can reaffirm such 
systemic repositioning. But again, the defining element of SCA is not a particular act; SCA 
is defined by a structure of acts that privileges the categorical repositioning of a 
population group in society. 
SCA is illustrated in the structural violence committed by the federal authorities of 
the United States against migrants who illegally cross the nation’s southern border. 
 
3 For example, the Monacan Indians, who lived in the region of Virginia, only received an official state 
designation in 1989. In that year, Virginia’s government and general assembly recognized this tribe 
formally. As of 2018, they are one of seven federally recognized tribes in the state (Hantman 2018, 
157-8). 
4 Johan Galtung writes, “Inequality then shows up in differential morbidity and mortality rates, between 
individuals in a district, between districts in a nation, and between nations in the international system - 
in a chain of interlocking feudal relationships” (Galtung, 1969, pp. 177). 
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Systemic Character Assassination of Migrants 
Currently, 33.8 million immigrants are authorized to live in the United States; an 
additional 11.1 million migrants live in the country illegally (Pew Research Center, 2015). 
These unauthorized immigrants entered the country illegally or overstayed their 
temporary visa. They tend to remain for extended periods, with approximately 66 percent 
of them having lived in the United States for ten years or more (Pew Research Center, 
2015). 
Like every sovereign state, the U.S. has the right to monitor and control the flow of 
migrants into its country, consistent with international law. Yet, within this right, many 
political figures have cast both authorized and unauthorized immigrants as criminals who 
represent an existential threat to native born Americans. The stigma of “dangerous 
invaders” is embodied in the categorical positioning of those migrants who enter through 
the U.S.-Mexico border. Such a stigma is intensified through images of “hordes” of 
criminals laying siege there. Political officials, such as Senator Ted Cruz, Congresswoman 
Michele Bachman and Congressman Steve King, have railed against their alleged crimes, 
recounting alleged episodes of sexual violence, gangland murders, and drug smugglers. 
Before his ascension to the presidency, candidate Donald Trump intensified the rhetoric 
with his tweet of July 13, 2015: 
When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best . . . They’re 
sending people that have many problems, and they’re bringing those 
problems to us. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re 
rapists. And some, I assume, are good people (Reilly, 2016). 
Such political rhetoric over immigration has the effect of virtually essentializing migrants 
as invaders, which is to say that a large population of dangerous criminals are living 
amidst the nation’s good people. 
Do immigrants represent a security threat? The evidence about their criminality is 
quite clear. While some immigrants—authorized and unauthorized—violate criminal law, 
native-born men have a higher rate of imprisonment for violation of criminal law than 
immigrant men. According to a 2008 report by U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the 
actual number of MS-13 gang members crossing the border illegally represents a tiny 
percentage (only 0.0075 percent) of the total number of migrants. For immigrants 
residing in the U.S., the rate of incarceration of immigrants is lower than native-born 
residents. In 2014, unauthorized immigrants were incarcerated at a rate that is 44 percent 
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below that of native-born citizens (Landgrave & Nowrasteh, 2017). This is consistent with 
a 2010 American Immigration Council study of incarcerated 18-39-year-old men. Of these 
men, 1.6 % were immigrants, while 3.3 % were native born. 
Nevertheless, many governmental institutions define the immigration problem as 
a threat to national security. This framing of immigration has direct policy implications 
for the U.S. immigration enforcement agencies within the Department of Homeland 
Security: Immigration and Customs Enforcement [ICE] and Customs and Border Patrol 
[CPB]. As their names indicate, both agencies establish national security as their primary 
mission, developing strategies needed, presumably, to ward off threats to the homeland. 
From its website, ICE identifies the objective of its enforcement and removal operations 
[ERO] as follows: 
The ERO directorate upholds U.S. immigration law at, within, and beyond 
our borders. ERO's work is critical to the enforcement of immigration law 
against those who present a danger to our national security, are a threat to 
public safety, or who otherwise undermine the integrity of our immigration 
system (https://www.ice.gov/about). 
Additionally, former acting Director of ICE Thomas Homan offered the following 
testimony in 2016 to the Homeland Security Subcommittee of the U.S. Congress: 
You should look over your shoulder, and you need to be worried . . . Most 
of the criminal aliens we find in the interior of the United States, they 
entered as a non-criminal. If we wait for them to violate yet another law 
against a citizen of this country, then it’s too late. We shouldn’t wait for 
them to become a criminal. (Foley, 2017) 
With such a rationale, ICE has established itself as a law enforcement agency. This is 
illustrated, for example, in a formal partnership known as ICE directive 287 (g) between 
ICE and the local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies. This directive requires 
criminal justice officials to provide ICE officials with critical information about the 
whereabouts of unauthorized immigrants. 
With immigrants positioned as security threats, some state legislative bodies have 
enacted measures that draw upon military strategies. Recent immigration laws are 
designed to promote “voluntary” self-deportation of illegal migrants through 
government-sponsored attrition. Of course, attrition is a familiar strategy of military 
leaders. During World War I, allied forces sought to destroy the enemy’s resources 
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through a series of incursions over an extended period, seeking to undermine their will to 
fight. In like measure, legislators around the country have adopted a strategy of fear to 
undermine the sense of security of immigrants. In Arizona, the statute SB 1070 is 
designed to threaten “illegals” in public spaces. This law requires police officers to check 
the legality of anyone who is “reasonably suspected” of unlawful residency, prohibits 
employers from hiring “illegals” and property owners cannot rent to them. The law’s 
rationale is conveyed as follows: “The intent of this act is to make attrition through 
enforcement the public policy of all state and local government agencies in Arizona, to 
discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens” (Maldonado, 2010). The 
law’s primary architect rationalized the law as a means to promote the “voluntary” self-
deportation of illegal immigrants.5 Alabama’s HB 56 law also establishes attrition as state 
policy. According to the law’s chief sponsor, the law is intended to attach “every aspect of 
an illegal alien’s life . . . to make it difficult for them to live here so they will deport 
themselves (Waslin, 2012, p. 3). Similar restrictive laws were enacted in Georgia, Indiana, 
South Carolina, and Utah. These laws are designed to generate fear as state policy, so 
“illegal immigrants” will realize the dangers of entering public spaces. 
Conjoined with this militaristic rhetoric of legislative bodies is the courtroom 
policies that criminalize migrants. In 2005, the Department of Homeland Security and 
the Department of Justice launched Operation Streamline [OS]. This program was 
originally designed to combat drug trafficking, weapons trafficking and human 
smuggling. In recent years, OS has been extended to prosecute those convicted migrant 
who enter the U.S. illegally. This extension was included within the “zero-tolerance” 
policy of 2018 by Attorney General Jeff Sessions (Robertson, et al., 2012). Circumventing 
the civil immigration system, OS requires that all cases of undocumented entry from 
Mexico be handled through the criminal justice system. What distinguishes OS from most 
other cases of criminality is the fast-paced courtroom proceedings that occur with a large 
group of defendants. Violations of immigration laws are also treated as a criminal rather 
than an administrative matter. Those prosecuted for the first time are charged with a 
 
5 In full support of this law, Arizona Governor Jan Brewer cited immigrant criminality as the 
justification for this law: 
Well, we all know that the majority of the people that are coming to Arizona and trespassing are not 
becoming drug mules . . . The drug cartels have taken control of the immigration. So, they are 
criminals. They’re breaking the law when they are trespassing and they’re criminals when they pack 
the marijuana and the drugs on their backs … Human rights violations that have taken place (by the 
cartels) victimizing immigrants and the families are abhorrent (CNN Wire Staff, 2010). 
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misdemeanor which requires a maximum six-month sentence (Lydgate, 2010). Those 
charged with illegal entry with a previous prosecution for the same sort of violation are 
charged with a felony which carries a maximum two-year sentence. Defense attorneys 
encourage the defendants to plead guilty, which would bring a shorter prison term 
compared to those defendants who do not plead guilty and are subsequently convicted. 
As a result, under OS, those defendants who do in fact plead guilty are prosecuted at a 
rate of 99% (Lydgate, 2010). 
Operation Streamline has been implemented in the Federal District Court of every 
U.S.-Mexico border area, except for California (Robertson, et al., 2012). For example, the 
Federal District Court of Tucson, Arizona, is responsible for large numbers of 
immigration-related cases in the country. On one particular day, they prosecuted 70 in 30 
minutes, an average of 25 seconds per case, according to the New York Times (Santos, 
2014). This District Court has handled up to 200 cases of unauthorized border crossings 
in a single morning. On other days this District Court will provide slightly more time per 
case, as much as two minutes per defendant (Robertson, et al., 2012, p. 2). 
On January 9, 2020, I observed an OS proceeding in Tucson Federal Court, where 
a large group of migrants were accused of illegal entry or reentry into the U.S. In a sterile 
courtroom, about 50 young people, presumably all Latinos/as, entered with chains at 
their waist/hands and at their feet. They were dressed in sloppy clothes, such as baggy 
jeans and tee shirts, possibly those worn when they were apprehended days or weeks 
before. I saw no orange prison clothes. I documented portions of the interaction between 
judge and defendants.  The judged read out the names of 10 defendants, then explained 
the accusation against them: 
“Each has been charged with either a misdemeanor for entry into the 
United States or a felony for entry with a prior deportation. Each of you 
signed a guilty plea. The guilty plea means that if you enter again, you could 
be charged and punished.” 
The judge then read the name of one defendant. 
“Did you plead guilty in your plea agreement?” 
“Si,” was the reply. 
“Did your attorney explain your charges?” 
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“Si.” 
“Did you have difficulty understanding the charges?” 
“No.” 
“Do you now plead guilty to these charges?” 
“Si.” 
“By pleading guilty, you are waiving certain rights and you agree to stipulate 
removal. Mr. … Did you enter the United States through Sasabe [Arizona]?” 
“Si.” 
The judge declared the guilt of the defendant and ordered a sentence of time served. 
This back-and-forth interaction was repeated for each of the 10 defendants 
standing in a row. The entire exchange between judge and defendant took about 60 
seconds. The sentencing of the first 10 people was the same minus the time served since 
their incarceration, as presumably they were picked up together. Then another group of 
10 defendants stepped up and engaged in the same process, resulting in all cases of 
conviction and sentencing. After this group of 40 defendants walked out of the courtroom 
in shackles, another group of about 40 other shackled defendants shuffled in, and then 
another group of about 20. The entire proceeding for approximately 100 defendants took 
75 minutes. All of them would be deported immediately, for those whose sentence was 
time served, or be transferred to prison to serve the remainder of their sentence (Marcías-
Rojas, 2016, p. 94). 
Of course, the OS cases vary. For example, in some cases the names of the town 
where the defendants were apprehended were Douglas or Nogales. Also, the sentencing 
ranged from time-served to as much as 180 days. The sentences were varied; 30 days was 
frequent; one had 75 days, another 105, and one 160 days. There was no explanation for 
this variation. As I learned later, lengthy sentences were most likely given to those who 
re-entered the country after a prior deportation, which represents a felony. 
As the judge read their rights and solicited their responses, it struck me that he 
used a respectful tone towards the defendants and expressed concern for their well-being. 
After delivering the guilty sentence, he said to each defendant, “Good luck to you.” No 
insults were hurled, nor was there evidence of lying, name-calling, or malicious labeling. 
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This interaction between judge and defendants lacked any expression or tone of hostility 
or disdain. 
Yet, the symbols at the systems level are clear. The defendants’ shackles reminded 
me of the chain gangs of the South—a familiar symbol of racialized criminal justice. 
Beneath the verbal commands of the courtroom guards, the restrictions of the physical 
movements and the shackles around their bodies lies the latent power of systemic 
degradation. OS establishes the positioning of migrants as lesser beings in relation to the 
prosecution of native-born Americans. Their courtroom cases are rushed as is their time 
with defense attorneys. What I witnessed was the manifestations of the systemic 
positioning of migrants as criminals, yet without insult, slander, name-calling or 
malicious labeling. This is a clear case of SCA. 
Systemic Character Assassination as Power 
SCA can be understood through the power relations among categories of people. A deep 
dive into the meaning of governmental power is instructive for understanding SCA. In 
general, power represents a disposition—a potentiality—to act in certain ways that 
potentially influence others. This includes the capacity to dominate, rule, govern, sway, 
control influence, legislate, or alter the behavior and thoughts of the nation’s population. 
As a potentiality, power is observable only when it is exercised and not before. This 
potentiality of power is realized in governmental programs to contribute to society’s 
health, well-being, and security, or in programs that harm, threaten or severely neglect 
certain people. 
With this course-grained conception, we can think of the power of SCA as simple 
and objective. First, the following logicality can capture the simplicity of such power. If 
certain enabling conditions are realized, then the agent with power can act in ways that 
influences another person or group. This pattern implies directionality from an agent to 
a person or group being influenced, like an arrow’s flight. Second, power seems to be 
something that is possessed, like money exchanged for commodities or services. 
These two characteristics of power regarding its linearity and objectivity as a 
commodity are inappropriate for understanding the power dynamics of SCA. First, such 
power relations do not imply a simple linearity. The idea that power begins and ends 
within a sequence of potential interactions between agent and target tacitly suppresses 
the many social-political influences on such interactions. In general, state power has no 
single source. It lacks concrete directionality, and it is not independent of the actions, 
processes, and thoughts of governmental officials. Second, power cannot be acquired, 
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seized, possessed, accumulated, and hoarded by any human agent. Regarding its 
meaning, Foucault (1990) argues that power is not something tangible like a commodity. 
Power has neither directionality nor a fixed point of origin. Never concentrated entirely 
in the hands of a single person, not even political tyrants, power is like “manifold relations 
of force that take shape and come into play in the machinery of production, in families, 
limited groups, and institutions” (p. 94). 
Regarding SCA, the deep meaning of its power centers on certain fields of practice.6 
That is, such power can be understood through the capacity of certain actors to exert their 
influence over others in particular fields of practice. A field consists of a landscape of 
practices guided by socially sanctioned norms such as the explicit rules of the 
organization, commands by an institution’s director, and public principles that guide the 
institution’s operations (Bourdieu et al, 1994).7 Within a field, each player engages in 
certain strategic practices as they navigate through the channels of power. Such practices 
represent tactics for surviving, struggling or possibly advancing within the ranks. Within 
a field, each participant is given a certain degree of capital. Additionally, the field is 
structured in ways that determine the range of possible action for each participant. 
Conformity to the field’s game rules is expected; successful navigation in a field requires 
skillful mastery of such rules. Some rules are explicit, such as executive orders to 
subordinates, and others are tacit, such as mundane expectations for the proper displays 
of deference, respect and honor to superiors. Yet, each field offers a certain range of 
flexibility, where the agent is given some license in selecting or applying the rules. But the 
agent who goes too far by explicitly violating rules risks reprimand, punishment or 
hardship imposed on the offender. 
 
6 For this distinction between surface meaning and deep meaning, I draw upon the insights of 20th-
century philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein. He argued that a term’s surface meaning, which he called its 
surface grammar, consists of a network of similarities—family resemblances—across a potentially wide 
range of contexts in which a term is used. A term’s deep meaning lies beneath its surface in the forms 
of life—patterns of practice and thought—that are presupposed in the proper use of the term. For 
example, the deep meaning of ‘violence’ refers to forms of life that impact an agent’s psychological 
state, the history of social relations between agent and target and the social norms that underpin the 
violent behavior. The deep meaning of violence reveals its underlying processes, mechanisms and 
structures, all of which contribute to understanding its surface meaning. 
 
7 A field refers to “networks of social relations, structured systems of social positions, within which 
struggles or maneuvers take place over resources, stakes and access” (Oakes et al., 1998, p. 260). 
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Moreover, a field is structured with respect to the social or political positions 
assigned to its participants (Bourdieu et al., 1994). In general, a position refers to the 
relative normative stance that an individual or group is assigned as implicated in certain 
social interactions with others (Harré & Moghaddam, 2003). Actors adopt, are assigned, 
are born into, or are forcibly defined by positions. Within a position, actors are afforded 
a certain degree of power in their relations with others; they are given certain social 
capital, which an agent can use for his or her advantage. For example, positions are 
reflected in the normalized interactions between doctors and their patients, prison guards 
and the prisoners, and militant commanders and their subordinates. 
There are three elements to the power dynamics of SCA: rules, positions and 
actions. These interlocking elements are located within a field of practice. These elements 
are represented in Figure 1 regarding the courtroom proceedings associated with 
Operation Streamline. 
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Figure 1 Systemic Character Assassination Field of Practice 
Regarding the power relations of SCA, there is always the possibility of resistance. 
Returning to the OS that I observed in Arizona, no defendant exhibited any outward sign 
of resisting the directives and judgments in the courtroom hearing. Yet, resistance is 
evident in the repetition of unauthorized border crossing. Again, the Department of 
Justice rationalizes the need for OS on the grounds of deterrence, arguing that the sheer 
volume of prosecutions would significantly reduce the number of unauthorized border 
crossings. Yet, many migrants have not been deterred. According to recent research 
findings, the rate of the prosecutions of immigration violations has no significant 
deterrent effect. The documented failure of OS to deter migrants demonstrates the power 
of resistance against the criminal justice system. The decision to migrate is influenced 
more strongly by “push factors,” such as the fear of life-threatening violence in one’s home 
country and “pull factors” such as the lure of joining loved ones living in the U.S. 
(Corradini et al., 2018, p. 3). 
Conclusion 
Character assassination does not always occur with an agent’s intentions to degrade 
someone.  In cases of protracted conflicts, governmental powers tend to contort the 
social-political order in ways that rationalize their dominance. Within such an order, the 
placement of low power group as inferiors captures, presumably, their essential nature. 
They are living with a taint that cannot be removed by their actions, achievements or 
individual character traits.  Such placement defines systems of malignant categorical 
positioning, which in turn constitutes a sort of existential violence.     
Yet, the exercise of governmental power reveals a fundamental paradox. Exercising 
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subsequent contexts.  The possible resistance to such power is an ever-present condition 
of the field of power-oriented practices. Governmental officials exercising power has the 
counter-effect of undermining their subsequent use of power. Possible resistance is not a 
secondary impact of self-contained governmental power. Such resistance is included 
tacitly in the exercise of such power, reflecting the dynamism of the relationship between 
agent and target. With such dynamism, the agent of power in one field of practice can 
target agents of another field. The exertion of legitimate power by a governmental 
authority within their state-centric field has a direct impact on the reactive-power of the 
targeted population group within their community-centric field of practices.  Of course, 
the paradoxical nature of governmental power is an anathema to most governmental 
authorities, who are guided by a linear conception of sovereign power. Such simplicities 
serve the interests of authorities to artificially suppress the disabling conditions of their 
controls, as such conditions are completely alien to governmental mandates. 
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